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Abstract 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries can voluntarily participate in climate change mitigation 
through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), where emission reduction credits from projects in 
developing countries are bought by industrialized countries to meet their own commitments. Before its 
implementation, developing-country experts opposed the CDM, arguing that it would sell off their 
countries’ cheapest emission reduction options and force them to invest in more expensive measures to 
meet their future reduction targets. This paper analyzes this “low-hanging fruit” argument empirically. 
CDM projects’ emissions abatement costs and potentials are estimated for different technologies in eight 
countries, using capital budgeting tools and the information from the projects’ documentation. Through a 
comparison with theoretical marginal abatement cost curves, we discuss whether the low-hanging fruit 
argument holds. We find that the CDM is not yet capturing a large portion of the identified abatement 
potential in most countries. While the costs of most emissions reduction opportunities grasped lie below 
the average credit price, there is still plenty of low-cost opportunities available. Mexico and Argentina 
appear to use the CDM exclusively for harvesting the low-hanging fruit, whereas in the other countries 
analyzed more expensive projects are also accessing the CDM. This evidence challenges the low-hanging 
fruit claim. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Under the framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and 
the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries have no binding targets for greenhouse gas emission reductions 
up to 2012. They can however voluntarily participate in climate change mitigation through the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), one of the Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility instruments. Under the CDM, 
emission reduction credits (so-called Certified Emission Reductions or CERs) from projects in developing 
countries are bought by industrialized countries1, which can use them to meet their own reduction 
commitments. While its main goal is ensuring cost-effectiveness of mitigation measures, the CDM has the 
second aim to benefit host developing countries by promoting investment in sustainable development and 
facilitating technology transfer, thereby contributing to their transition to a more climate-friendly 
economy.  
 
Previous to the full-scale implementation of the CDM, developing-country NGOs and experts opposed 
this mechanism, arguing that the CDM would imply selling off developing countries’ cheap emission 
reduction options (the “low-hanging fruit”) to industrialized countries. This would result in developing 
countries having to invest in more expensive measures to meet their own reduction targets when they 
were to commit to these. See Narain and van’t Veld (2008) for a review of some occasions when the low-
hanging fruit issue has been discussed in the Kyoto negotiations. This low-hanging fruit focus of the 
CDM has also been criticized more recently from a developed-country perspective, on the grounds that 
the subsidy granted by the CDM to very large, low-cost CDM projects is disproportionately large as 
compared to the cost of implementing the emission reductions (Wara, 2006). Despite these concerns and 
criticism, the CDM has grown successfully even in the countries that were initially most sceptical of it 
(such as China, see Tangen and Heggelund, 2003 and Bang et al., 2005), and as of October 2009, almost 
4700 projects and 2.8 billion tonnes CO2eq of emission reductions are expected to be achieved up to 2012 
(URC, 2009). For the last three years, monthly project inflows averaged more than 100 and have not been 
touched by the economic and financial crisis to date. 
 
Now that new international negotiations are taking place with the goal of designing a new climate regime 
for the period after 2012, these arguments are likely to play an important role on the decisions to be taken. 
For a new post-2012 climate change agreement, there is considerable pressure that some fast-growing 
developing countries take up binding emission reduction commitments. Firstly, it is now recognized that 
                                                     
1 In the Kyoto Protocol, those industrialized countries with mandatory emission reduction targets for the period 2008-2012 are 
listed in Annex B, and thus known as “Annex B countries”. Annex B is an update of the UNFCCC’s Annex I, which lists the 
countries that were members of the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) in 1992, plus countries 
with economies in transition, including the Russian Federation, the Baltic States, and several Central and Eastern European States. 
Under the Convention, these countries agreed to reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. Countries in both lists 
are the same, except for Belarus and Turkey that do not appear in Annex B. In the following, countries with emission reduction 
targets will frequently be referred to as “industrialized countries”, and countries without targets (“non-Annex B countries”) as 
“developing countries”. It should be noted here that this concept of developing countries also includes some rapidly 
industrializing countries such as China, south-east Asian countries, and oil exporting countries of the Gulf region. 
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future global emissions reduction targets need to be much more ambitious than the Kyoto target for 
avoiding dangerous climate change. Secondly, some large and fast-growing developing countries already 
emit such high levels of GHGs that their participation is regarded as crucial for avoiding dangerous 
climate change2 (Bang et al., 2005; Gupta et al., 2007; Höhne et al., 2007; Parry et al., 2007; WRI, 2008). 
Thirdly, concerns about the impacts of climate policy on a country’s competitiveness in the global markets 
and on the likelihood that energy-intensive industries migrate to countries without emission reduction 
targets have been prominent in research, as well as in international and domestic policy debates (see e.g. 
Hourcade et al., 2001; Baumert and Kete, 2002; Cosbey, 2005; Barker et al., 2007; European Commission, 
2008). These concerns are leading industrialized countries to increasingly demand advanced developing 
countries to take up emission reduction commitments.  
 
Developing countries, however, oppose committing to reduction targets. Their main arguments are the 
historical responsibility of industrialized countries for already existing carbon concentrations in the 
atmosphere; the negative impact that reduction targets might have on development, poverty alleviation 
and growth, which would put them in still worse conditions to compete in the globalized markets; and 
notions of fairness in the amount of emissions a person is allowed to generate in developing countries as 
compared to industrialized ones. For detailed accounts of different countries’ and groupings’ positions in 
the international negotiations towards new climate commitments, see Bang et al. (2005) and, more 
recently, Höhne et al. (2007) and WRI (2009). 
 
The CDM experience is playing an important role in the climate negotiations as well. Some developing 
countries and environmental NGOs consider the CDM as a means for industrialized countries to shift 
their emissions reduction responsibility to other countries. Based on its project-by-project nature, critics 
argue that it creates disincentives for developing countries’ governments to pass climate-friendly 
legislation3. Due to the large financial flows achieved by the CDM, industrialized countries feel 
uncomfortable that the expectation to continue receiving these funds is a reason itself for advanced 
developing countries not to take more ambitious climate change mitigation actions. Finally, the costs of 
mitigation actions, coupled with the above-mentioned fear that the CDM has already captured the 
cheapest ones, make developing countries even more unwilling to commit. 
 
This paper focuses on this last argument, and intends to test it using empirical data. It thus seeks to 
contribute to the discussion on the role of offset mechanisms in achieving global GHG emission 
reductions. So far, as the discussion about the low-hanging fruit issue took place before the CDM was 
                                                     
2 Recent calculations suggest that China is now the largest CO2 emitter in the world, surpassing even the USA (MNP, 2008). 
However, per-capita emissions in this and other large developing countries are still very low in the global ranking.  
3 In order to be approved, CDM projects need to demonstrate that they would not have happened without the support form the 
CDM (additionality rule). Thus, if in country X there is a piece of legislation mandating, for example, the use of energy saving 
lamps, then this country cannot propose a CDM project for replacing incandescent bulbs with energy saving ones. This rule 
discourages countries from passing climate-friendly legislation, because they do not want to lose the revenues from possible CDM 
projects. To avoid this perverse incentive, the CDM authorities created a new rule in November 2005, which states that climate-
friendly policies passed after the year 2001 are not to be counted towards the additionality constraint of CDM projects. 
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fully operational, most of the research on this issue has been theoretical and model-based, and thus no 
empirically-based evidence of its validity has been presented yet. With the large number of CDM projects 
in the current portfolio, it is now possible to assess the validity of the low-hanging fruit claim. 
 
Firstly, we review the existing literature on the low-hanging fruit claim and on emissions reduction costs 
and potentials. Secondly, we detail our approach for testing this claim. We estimate the emissions 
abatement cost of CDM projects using the financial information provided in their Project Design 
Documents (PDDs). A dataset of projects, their technologies, estimated costs and expected amount of 
emission reductions is built for eight CDM host countries and summarized in the form of CDM-specific 
abatement cost curves. These curves are then compared with existing abatement cost curves and 
abatement potential estimations from the literature, in order to discuss whether only or mostly the 
cheapest abatement options are being captured by the CDM in each country. Conclusions for the CDM, 
the low-hanging fruit argument and its relevance for the ongoing climate negotiations follow. 
 
2. Greenhouse gas emissions abatement costs and potentials  
 
The discussion on the low-hanging fruit issue builds on the concepts of greenhouse gas emissions 
abatement costs and abatement potentials. Abatement costs describe the costs society has to bear for the 
reduction of one tonne of CO2 emissions – or the equivalent amount of other greenhouse gases – by a 
certain mitigation activity. Abatement costs are important considerations in the design of climate policy, as 
they determine the cost-effectiveness of individual policy or project choices. Abatement potentials – the 
volume of emissions reductions that can be achieved by applying a specific technology in a specific region 
or country in a certain period of time – are equally important, as they determine the amount of mitigation 
that is feasible. Following Bakker et al. (2007), potentials can be defined as technical abatement potential 
(reductions that can be realized based on technical and physical parameters), economic potential 
(reductions that can be realized below a certain cost level) and market potential (reductions that can be 
realized considering other market barriers). Costs and potentials for different technologies in a country or 
region are usually displayed together to form a marginal abatement cost curve (MAC).  
 
MAC curves are used extensively in environmental economics to link a firm’s (or a country’s) pollutant 
emission levels and the cost of each additional unit of pollution reduction (McKitrick, 1999). Examples of 
the use of MACs at the firm and at the country level can be found in McKitrick (1999), Ellerman and 
Decaux (1998) and Criqui et al. (1999). MAC curves for climate mitigation can be derived using a top-
down approach by means of macroeconomic (computable general equilibrium) models with a detailed 
energy sector component. They can also be obtained on the basis of engineering data of emission 
reduction technologies using a bottom-up approach (Criqui et al., 1999).  
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Climate-economy models and many studies use these curves systematically (see e.g. Kuik et al., 2008 for a 
meta-analysis of abatement cost estimates). However, abatement cost estimates are frequently based on 
expert opinion, or on model assumptions on the climate policy target, the emissions baseline, discounting 
rates, future technological options, among others. Further, there are only few abatement cost and potential 
studies focusing on developing countries. Two good examples are the efforts by Wetzelaer et al. (2007) 
and Bakker et al. (2007) to build an abatement cost curve for these countries in the years 2010 and 2020, 
respectively. Recently, the consultancy Mc Kinsey has started to develop global and country-specific MAC 
curves for the year 2030, which have eagerly been taken up in the international climate policy debate (see 
Enkvist et al. 2007 for an overview). However, as the assumptions and methodology used in the Mc 
Kinsey curves are not publicly accessible, in this study we opted for using only bottom-up MAC curves 
and abatement cost and potential estimations with more transparent assumptions that are easier to control 
for.  
 
3. The low-hanging fruit issue in the literature 
 
The low-hanging fruit issue – also known as the sold-out hypothesis, the cherry-picking or the cream-
skimming problem – has been a discussion point already during the negotiations towards the CDM. It 
claims that developing countries will be worse off after selling their cheapest abatement options (the low-
hanging fruits) to industrialized countries through the CDM, because they will have to invest in more 
expensive options later, when they assume their own emission reduction targets. 
 
Possible determinants of the low-hanging fruit issue 
Several characteristics of the climate regime give shape to this argument. First, a necessary condition for it 
to be true is that developing countries, especially the more advanced ones, will eventually “graduate” and 
commit to own GHG emission reduction targets (Akita, 2003). This is at present one of the most 
controversial debate topics in the international negotiations towards a post-Kyoto agreement. While 
Kyoto presupposes such a transition and industrialized countries are trying to push for it, the existing rules 
do not explicitly include it, and developing countries are – in the majority of cases – against this evolution. 
 
Second, the availability of CDM project options is not only influenced by the cost of the abatement 
measures, but it is also constrained by financial, technical and institutional barriers in the host countries. 
Especially the high CDM transaction costs and cumbersome registration procedures may prevent 
attractive abatement options from accessing the mechanism, particularly if they are small-scale. While this 
situation is expected to improve with new modalities of CDM projects, probably some of these cheap 
abatement options will remain available for contribution to the host country’s own reduction targets. Also 
the rules of the CDM constrain the abatement options that can access this mechanism: only those projects 
considered “additional” can be registered as CDM projects. If for example currently expensive mitigation 
options become cheaper, they might no longer fulfil the additionality criterion – if one uses low-hanging 
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fruit terminology, the fruit starts to “rot”. To date there has not been any comprehensive study assessing 
what portion of developing countries’ abatement potential is being captured by the CDM. 
 
Furthermore, new emissions abatement options may appear – and become cheaper in time – as 
technology evolves and as economies grow. The pool of abatement options is thus not a static one, but it 
may grow in the future, especially in developing countries.  
 
Finally, there is an international market for carbon reduction certificates. Even after one country 
graduates, there will be other developing countries still under the CDM system, which may continue to 
deliver cheaper carbon credits (Narain and van’t Veld, 2008). Similarly, as abatement options in some 
countries become scarce or more expensive, other countries (e.g. Africa, which as present is not playing an 
important role in the CDM market) will become more mature to enter the CDM market with more force. 
 
Modelling the low-hanging fruit issue  
So far, only theoretical analyses of the low-hanging fruit problem are available in the literature. Most of 
these studies focused on answering the question whether developing countries should participate in the 
CDM or not. Now, most countries have participated in the CDM. The question then turns out to be what 
the effects of this participation will be for the future climate regime, under the light of the low-hanging 
fruit hypothesis. 
 
Rose et al. (1999) compared the low-hanging fruit issue with the theory of resource exhaustion: there is a 
resource stock (carbon emission mitigation options) that is exploited and gradually depleted, which results 
in rising costs of implementation of emission mitigation projects. The study assumes that both CDM 
projects and own abatement measures belong to the same pool of mitigation options, which disregards 
possible differentiation of projects due to the additionality criterion or other entrance barriers for CDM 
projects. It assumes that the cost of CDM projects is partially or totally compensated by an industrialized 
country, but that own abatement measures only imply costs for the host country. Technological change is 
also included in the model. The study finds out that participating in the CDM can impose costs on the 
future, but these costs can be offset by technological change, market power or compensation. A low-
hanging fruit problem exists in the model if the host country is not compensated for this future cost 
increase. 
 
Rajamani (1999) characterizes unilateral CDM projects as a possible solution to the low-hanging fruit 
problem. Unilateral projects can be understood in this context as those where the host (developing) 
country invests in a project, registers it as CDM and then banks, leases or sells the CERs in the 
international market (see also Michaelowa, 2007 for a more detailed classification and description of 
unilateral and bilateral CDM projects). While bilateral projects are funded by a buyer in an industrialized 
country which is mainly interested in acquiring cheap CERs, in unilateral projects it is the seller in the 
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developing country who bears the project’s risks, sets the trading conditions and can push for higher CER 
prices. As certain project types achieve a CER income much larger than the abatement costs, the gains for 
the host country from unilateral CDM projects of these types can be considerable. In this case, even if 
cheap options are used up by the CDM, the profits from the CER sales could compensate for that loss. 
 
Olsen and Painuly (2002) analyze the absolute gains for developing countries from participating or not 
participating in the CDM by simulating three scenarios for the Kyoto period and a “Kyoto-for-ever” 
scenario for the post-Kyoto period. They use abatement supply curves from a global general equilibrium 
model and demand data derived from IEA emissions projections. Assuming that all countries take up 
emission reduction commitments after Kyoto, they conclude that the CDM is always beneficial for 
developing countries if their reduction commitments after Kyoto are not linked to their baseline emissions 
(which are affected by the CDM). Even if their reduction targets are linked to their baseline, they benefit if 
carbon credit prices are high enough to offset time-discount losses. Market power and technological 
change can influence the gains.  
 
Akita (2003) develops a simple theoretical model of a developing country with two mitigation options 
(one low-cost and one high-cost) and two time periods (before and after entering the Kyoto Protocol’s 
Annex B). Several conditions are incorporated in the model, which, according to the author, are necessary 
for the existence of a low-hanging fruits issue. It assumes developing countries will join the Annex B in 
the future (“graduation”). After graduation, JI instead of CDM would facilitate technology transfer. The 
CDM projects would concentrate on the low-hanging fruits. There are cheap abatement options beyond 
the technological reach of the developing country today and due to technological progress a developing 
country can undertake an abatement measure tomorrow that it could not undertake today. However, an 
industrialized country, with more advanced technology, could invest in this project as a CDM today. Such 
CDM project would induce technological improvements in the developing country. Finally, the model 
allows that the high-hanging fruits may be harvested before the low-hanging ones. Akita concludes that 
the low-hanging fruits argument holds, but only for intermediate levels of foreign technology costs and 
CDM-induced technological development in the country.  
 
Bréchet et al. (2004) consider the possibility that the host country’s future emission reduction target may 
become more stringent if it participates in the CDM, as the post-CDM emissions level may become the 
baseline to establish the future abatement obligations. This would worsen the low-hanging fruit problem, 
since not only the cheap options would be taken already, but also the emissions reduction target to be 
achieved would be more stringent than in a case without CDM. In their model, they also introduce 
variations in the credit prices, the possibility to bank credits from one period to the other and uncertainty 
about the future prices of permits. Only unilateral CDM is incorporated in the model. They conclude that 
developing countries should in general participate in the CDM, unless the credit prices are relatively low 
during the first period; that banking of credits from one period to the other reduces the low-hanging fruit 
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problem; and that three effects are likely to limit the extent of CDM participation: endowment effect (the 
CDM reduces the future allowed emissions quota), irreversibility effect (reduction projects last longer than 
one commitment period, and thus emissions cannot be larger in the second period than in the first one) 
and uncertainty effect (of future CER prices).  
 
Narain and van’t Veld (2008) sustain that the low-hanging fruits problem does not stem from the fact that 
the host country will need to use a different, more expensive abatement measure after graduation. They 
argue that the low-hanging fruit problem originates because the host country gives up the option of 
delaying the cheap abatement option until graduation and then undertaking it itself. In their paper, they 
show that the previous characterizations of the low-hanging fruit problem disregard that there is an 
international carbon credit market. Thus, after graduation, the host country does not necessarily have to 
invest in more expensive abatement domestically, since it can buy credits from the market. The authors 
also argue that there is no low-hanging fruit problem under perfect CDM market conditions: with perfect 
information, the host country can choose whether it approves any specific CDM project or not. However, 
assuming some form of myopia of the non-Annex B government due to its private interest in the CDM 
project and/or its impatience (corruption, political instability, lack of human capital or legal infrastructure, 
lack of knowledge), the low-hanging fruit problem occurs either when the Annex B investors have market 
power (for example, under a monopsony), or when the credit price is increasing with time and the host 
country cannot benefit from these rising returns for its CDM project.  
 
Germain et al. (2007) analyze the interaction between the low-hanging fruit issue and the types of CDM 
project baseline definition: absolute (based on total emissions) or relative (based on the emissions-output 
ratio) baselines. They assume that CDM projects will be undertaken mostly unilaterally, but also make the 
analysis for bi- or multilateral projects. They conclude that the low-hanging fruit issue is unfounded for 
unilateral projects under any type of baseline. It is always optimal for the developing country to implement 
CDM projects for every strictly positive permits price. Low-cost abatement projects are always 
implemented first, since the capital-energy ratio is increasing with the permits price. Thus, it is not optimal 
for the developing country to keep its low-hanging fruit for future use, and it should accept the 
implementation of all CDM projects up to the optimal capital-energy ratio. Above this threshold, it should 
receive financial compensation for continuing to implement CDM projects. The endowment effect and 
increases in the level of uncertainty on future permit prices raise the level of the required compensation. 
For bilateral or multilateral projects, if the permit price is high at the beginning, the developing country 
needs to receive a minimal share of the surplus in order to have incentives to accept some CDM projects. 
Below this minimal share, the country should participate in the CDM only if it is compensated for that. 
 
The results from these theoretical studies imply that the existence of a low-hanging-fruit problem depends 
on the evolution of carbon credit prices, the way in which future abatement commitments for developing 
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countries are set, whether CDM projects are developed unilaterally or bilaterally, on the market power of 
the countries and on the possibility to bank credits from one commitment period to the next.  
 
4. The low-hanging fruit issue in this study 
 
In this paper, we take an approach similar to the one chosen by Rose et al. (1999) for conceptualizing the 
low-hanging fruit issue: we assume that countries have a stock of emission reduction options, and that 
part of this stock has been captured by the CDM. By comparing the complete stock to the portion 
captured by the CDM, we can draw conclusions on whether emission abatement options are being 
depleted through the CDM, and on which abatement options are being captured: if mostly the cheapest 
ones are, then the low-hanging fruit argument holds. 
 
This approach is a strong simplification of reality, as it does not take into account the carbon market 
dynamics that, according to most studies cited above, influences the availability of emission reduction 
options. Both emissions trading and banking – the possibility to save carbon credits earned today for 
using (or selling) them in a future period – relax the problem of exhaustion of emission reduction  
options, as they increase flexibility in achieving emission reduction targets. Economic growth and 
technological change will make new emission reduction options appear, so that the abatement stock is 
replenished. Learning effects and technology diffusion will make these new emission reduction options 
become cheaper in time, so that there will be new low-hanging fruits to pick.  
 
However, in a given moment in time, we can assume that the stock of abatement options available is 
fixed. As a result, our test of the low-hanging fruit problem relies on two hypotheses: 
- Size hypothesis: The larger the portion of the country’s mitigation potential (measured in tCO2eq) 
that has been captured by the CDM, the more likely there is a low-hanging fruit problem. 
- Cost hypothesis: The larger the portion of the country’s cheap emission reduction options that 
has been captured by the CDM (measured in tCO2eq), the more likely there is a low-hanging fruit 
problem. 
If under this extreme assumption of no dynamics the CDM is not exhausting the stock of abatement 
options, we know that the situation must be even better, because the stock will grow in the future. Thus, 
this assumption leads us to be on the safe side for the analysis. 
 
Our conceptualization of “cheap emission reduction options” relies on the carbon market: we define as 
cheap all those emission reduction options whose abatement costs are below the average carbon market 
price for CERs. This is in line with the notion that the market will influence the choice of emission 
reduction actions: if the market price does not compensate for the cost of mitigation, then it is not 
financially attractive to engage in this action, and it is preferable to trade carbon credits in the market.  
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5. Data and methods 
 
CDM cost data 
General CDM project information is available from a public database, the CDM pipeline, which is 
maintained and updated monthly by UNEP Risoe Centre (URC, 2009). More specific information for 
each project is also publicly available in the project documentation that can be downloaded from the 
UNFCCC website4. This documentation often includes a financial analysis, as this is one possible method 
for demonstrating that a project complies with the CDM requirement of being additional: if the analysis 
shows that the project requires the subsidy from the CDM to be financially attractive, then it is deemed 
additional. The alternative method for demonstrating additionality is a barrier analysis: if the project 
proponent demonstrates convincingly that there are substantive barriers that prevent the project from 
taking place without CDM support (for example technological barriers or difficulties in accessing 
financing), then the project is considered additional.  
 
While this is the only CDM-specific source of financial data that is available, there is a risk of having 
selection bias because we only get information from those projects choosing to use a financial analysis for 
additionality demonstration. Indeed, one could think that precisely the projects using the barrier analysis 
are the low-hanging fruits, and that they do not present their financial data because they are so cheap that 
they would not pass the additionality test if they did. This suspicion is shared by the CDM regulators, as 
can be seen in the proposal by the CDM Methodology Panel to enhance the barrier test for projects that 
are likely to have high revenues (CDM Methodology Panel, 2008) and in the recently adopted “Guidelines 
for objective demonstration and assessment of barriers” (CDM Executive Board, 2009). 
 
A quick exploration of the data provided by the IGES CDM Project Database (IGES, 2010), which 
includes information on what type of financial analysis is used in each CDM project, shows that of all 
CDM projects already registered or seeking registration by the end of 2009, around 35% do not provide 
any financial data in their public documentation. The factors affecting the decision to include a financial 
analysis in the CDM project documentation are, as will be discussed in more detail below, not only the 
technology involved in the project, but also the size of the project, the host country and notably the time 
passed since the CDM was initiated. This leads us to believe that our data do not suffer from selection 
bias.  
 
We can assume that the technology involved in the project is the main determinant of the project’s cost. 
Then, if the cheap technologies never provide financial information, we will have selection bias. In CDM 
projects, the technology used is roughly given by the “project type”, which is a classification that considers 
both the economic sector involved (e.g. renewable energy, agriculture, forestry, cement industry) and the 
                                                     
4 Each project has a standardized “Project Design Document” (PDD), which is used throughout the approval process and is 
publicly available for analysis. 
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generic technology used to reduce emissions (wind energy, hydro power, reforestation, energy efficiency 
improvements). In the IGES data, we can see that in terms of project types, only the projects reducing the 
industrial gas HFC-23 (a very potent greenhouse gas) never perform the financial analysis, which is due to 
the fact that they do not have any revenues and thus can show their additionality in a simple way. In all 
other project types (except in those that currently have only one or two projects registered), at least 30% 
of the projects provide some kind of financial data. Thus, for almost all project types (except HFC-23 and 
some of those that have only one or two projects registered) we have some cost data available. This 
minimizes the risk of selection bias.  
 
The size5 of the project is also an important variable affecting the decision to include a financial analysis in 
the project documentation. Almost 80% of the large CDM projects include a financial analysis, while only 
45% of the small ones do. This is related both to the simplified modalities for additionality determination 
existing for small projects, and to the above-mentioned regulatory mistrust against the barrier test. With 
respect to the countries, in all main CDM hosts we find both projects performing and not performing a 
financial analysis, but there are considerable differences: while in China, for example, over 90% of projects 
include some kind of financial data, in India only 45% do, and in Mexico only 71%. Finally, the time 
elapsed since the first CDM project was submitted for validation (December 2003) increases the 
likelihood that a new project includes a financial analysis in its documentation, and this is applicable to 
most project types, as can be seen in Figure 1. Indeed, as the CDM rules have become clearer and stricter 
over time, more projects choose to perform an investment analysis to demonstrate additionality.  
 
The financial information is not completely standardized in the PDDs: especially in the early projects, it 
was sufficient to present some financial indicators of the project (Internal Rate of Return (IRR) or Net 
Present Value (NPV)) to show whether it is financially attractive or not. This has improved: now large-
scale projects opting for a financial analysis must include an excel sheet detailing the project’s cash flow. 
This allows us to verify the assumptions made in the financial analysis and, if needed, standardize them to 
improve comparability across projects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
5 In the CDM, the size of the project is determined either in terms of its output capacity (for renewable energy projects), the 
amount of energy consumption reduced (for energy efficiency projects) or the amount of emission reductions achieved (for all 
other projects) (CDM Rulebook, 2010). Projects considered to be small according to these criteria can use simplified approval 
methodologies, which include a simplified demonstration of additionality. 
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Figure 1: Percentage of registered CDM projects with some kind of financial information in 
PDDs, according to project type and year of submission for validation 
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Source: IGES CDM Project Database, January 4th, 2010. Own calculations. 
Note: To simplify the graph, HFC, N2O, and other project types with very few registered projects are not included. 
HFC projects never include financial information in their PDDs. N2O projects include some kind of financial 
information in more than 90% of cases. Other renewable energies follow a trend similar to the one for biogas. PFC 
projects always include financial information. Transportation, material use and leak reduction projects have so far not 
included any financial information in their PDDs. Data for projects submitted during 2009 is not included, as only 
very few of these projects have been registered. 
 
 
CDM-specific abatement cost calculation 
As shown in Equation 1, we define a project’s abatement costs as the net present value of the project 
costs (investment and operation) minus its revenues (e.g. income from electricity sales), all divided by the 
amount of GHG emission reductions it expects to achieve (which is indicated by the amount of emission 
reduction credits the project expects to generate). In fact this is obviously the CDM project abatement 
cost per tonne of CO2 equivalents reduced (which is the unit in which greenhouse gas emission reductions 
are measured). We follow the usual terminology by just speaking about project abatement costs. 
 
CDM project abatement cost =       NPV(costs) – NPV(revenues)___          (1) 
    Amount of GHG emission reductions 
 
All costs are expressed in US dollars, either using the current interbank exchange rate at the time the 
project was proposed, or using the exchange rate provided by the project developer in the project 
documentation. 
 
Time discounting is a critical issue in cost calculations. In capital budgeting, time discounting is used to 
reflect the interest rates the project is subject to, plus any financial risks applicable to the country where the 
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investment is taking place, or to the type of investment being made. In the CDM, discount rates are chosen 
by the project participant, but need to be justified. Sill, there is a significant variation in the financial discount 
rates chosen for projects in different technological categories and in different countries. In order to have 
comparable information and to avoid the possible effect of financial discount rates being manipulated by 
project developers to obtain less attractive financial figures6, in our calculations the discount rates have been 
standardized for each country. The discount rate chosen for each country is the median of the discount rates 
utilized in the CDM projects within our sample taking place in the respective country, which was then 
rounded to the closest integer. As project developers have to substantiate the parameters they choose for the 
financial analysis (among them, the choice of the discount rate), we consider the median to be a good 
indicator of the real discount rate applicable in the country. The median was preferred to the mean because it 
avoids the influence of outliers. It was preferred to the mode because in several countries no mode was 
found; nonetheless, in most cases the median and the mode were identical. See Appendix 1 for an overview 
of host countries and the standardized discount rates applied.  
 
Abatement cost information was extracted from 252 registered7 CDM projects, covering 29 emission 
reduction technologies. These projects are mainly located in the eight host countries included in the 
sample (see below). For technologies where no sufficient financial information was found in these 
countries, the sample was extended to other countries. For the reason described above, HFC-23 reduction 
projects, very prominent in advanced developing countries, typically lack financial data in the project 
documentation and thus abatement cost estimations from secondary sources (Harnisch and Hendricks, 
2000; Jimenez, 2005; UNEP TEAP, 2002) have been used.  
 
The abatement cost data were then summarized in terms of the median abatement cost estimated for each 
technology (or CDM project type) included in the sample. 
 
Expected size of CDM emission abatement 
As an estimation of the amount of mitigation opportunities the CDM is expected to capture in a country, 
we aggregate the annual8 amount of carbon credits that all the CDM projects currently proposed in the 
country estimate. This information is taken from the CDM pipeline as of end of September 2009 (URC, 
2009). This is a very rough estimation, as it does not include new projects that could be proposed in the 
future, but it includes projects that have been proposed but not yet registered so far. Following current 
                                                     
6 Project developers have an incentive to manipulate their figures and try to show low revenues, so that the project appears 
financially unattractive, which is a requisite for being considered additional.  
7 A project only gets the CDM status once it has formally been registered by the CDM Executive Board. 
8 CDM projects are entitled to receive CERs only during a specific period of time, the so-called “crediting period”. Project 
developers can choose between a fixed 10-year crediting period or a 7-year crediting period that can be renewed up to two times 
(thus totalling 21 years). In the discussion about the low-hanging fruit issue, it is generally assumed that the reductions achieved 
through CDM projects will not be counted towards future emission limitations for their host countries (endowment effect), thus 
effectively exhausting emission reduction options even after the projects’ crediting periods. So, while we measure the emission 
reductions captured by the CDM annually to ensure comparability, it is to be noted that these emission reductions will be 
captured over a longer period of time. 
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project proposal rates (91 projects/month9), about 1365 new projects will enter the CDM pipeline until 
end of 2010. Following current project registration rates (47 projects/month9), only about 705 existing 
projects will be registered. As the CDM pipeline includes 2839 not-yet-registered projects as of end of 
September 2009, our estimation is likely to be larger than the real size of the CDM by the end of 2010, 
because many projects in the pipeline will not start generating emission reduction credits yet (unless the 
registration process accelerates significantly in the following months, which is rather unlikely). Finally, this 
estimation does not take into account the fact that the emission reductions actually achieved are – for 
most project types – less than the estimations provided in the project documentation (Castro and 
Michaelowa, 2008). This all implies that, for our discussion of the low-hanging fruit argument, we are 
again on the safe side: if a CDM with an overestimated size does not capture a large proportion of the 
theoretical abatement potential, then the low-hanging fruit issue is not likely to be a real problem. 
 
Comparison with theoretical abatement cost studies 
From the cost and the size information, marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves for the CDM are built. In 
order to test the size hypothesis, these curves are compared with MAC curves showing the technical 
emissions abatement potential in the respective country. These theoretical MAC curves are built by 
merging the information from several studies that have performed bottom-up assessments of the 
technologies available for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in individual countries, their costs, and the 
amount of emission reductions that could potentially be achieved (see the detail of the studies used in 
Appendix 2). Care was taken to avoid overlaps between the different studies. In order to test the cost 
hypothesis, a more detailed analysis of the portion of the abatement potential captured by the CDM for 
different cost categories is made.  
 
Case selection 
The low-hanging fruit argument is of interest for those developing countries that are under pressure to 
take more individual action for mitigating climate change. In the climate regime, action towards climate 
change mitigation is subject to the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities” of countries (UNFCCC, 2008: p. 3), which means that countries with more responsibility for 
causing climate change and with better capabilities to take action should do more. Responsibility can be 
measured in terms of greenhouse gas emissions levels, in absolute terms or per capita. Capability can be 
measured in terms of GDP per capita, which is an indication of the economic wealth of the country. 
Further, the low-hanging fruit problem is potentially relevant only to countries where the CDM has 
become significant.  
 
Thus, from the countries that are hosting at least 10 registered CDM projects, we selected those that 
ranked highest in terms of absolute CO2 emissions, CO2 emissions per capita and GDP per capita, by 
building an index that incorporates these three indicators with equal weights. Data was obtained from IEA 
                                                     
9 Average over the last 3 months of 2009. 
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(2007) and IMF (2008). The resulting sample includes China, South Korea, Mexico, South Africa, 
Thailand, Argentina, Malaysia and Israel. For Malaysia and Israel it was not possible to collect sufficient 
information for the theoretical abatement cost curves, so that they are discarded from the analysis10. 
However, they have been used for extracting CDM project cost information. Two important CDM host 
countries (the second and the third with most CDM projects, after China) are India and Brazil. They are, 
however, not covered in the sample: India has very low levels of emissions per capita and GDP per capita; 
Brazil has very low emissions per capita and its emissions come mainly from the land use sector, which is 
currently not covered under the CDM. Finally, Chile had an index value very similar to the one of 
Argentina. As Argentina has higher absolute emissions, this country was preferred for the analysis.  
 
6. Results 
 
CDM abatement costs 
Figure 2 shows box plots of the estimated emissions abatement costs of the projects in the sample, after 
standardizing their financial discount rates.  
 
Figure 2: Abatement costs of CDM projects (USD/t CO2 eq), by technology,  
with standardized discount rates 
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Sources: CDM projects’ Project Design Documents, own calculations. For HFC projects: Harnisch and Hendricks, 
2000; UNEP TEAP, 2002; Jimenez, 2005. The figures in parentheses show the sample size for each technology. 
 
                                                     
10 The consultancy Mc Kinsey has prepared a MAC curve for Israel, but the full report is only available in Hebrew, and the 
executive summary in English does not provide sufficient information for our purposes. Further, it focuses on the year 2030, 
which is too far away in the future for being comparable with the CDM now. 
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In these results, it is clear that even after standardizing discount rates, there is still a high variability in cost 
estimations for some technologies, and that thus these estimations need to be taken with care. However, 
even with this high variability, our results reproduce very closely the range and ranking of costs reported 
in abatement cost studies (see e.g. US EPA, 2006; Vattenfall, 2007; Wetzelaer et al., 2007): Methane and 
industrial gas reduction projects are cheaper than CO2 reduction projects, basically due to the higher 
global warming potential of these other gases; renewable energy projects, specifically wind, hydro and 
solar energy projects are among the costlier ones. All this is consistent with other marginal abatement cost 
curves and supports our results. The abatement costs of most of these CDM projects are below 20 USD, 
which is an indication that the emission credit income will make them attractive11. 
 
The variability of costs within project subtypes stems from various factors. Above we have already 
discussed the impact of financial discount rates on the cost estimations. These and other parameters 
(project lifetimes, inclusion of taxes, inclusion of financing costs) can be manipulated easily to make 
projects appear non-attractive. However, there are also large differences in the technologies used within 
project subtypes. For example, methane recovery projects from wastewater can consist of a sophisticated 
bioreactor, or just of a plastic membrane covering an already existing anaerobic lagoon. Further, 
biodigesters can be imported or can be manufactured domestically, which will also have an impact on 
costs. Biomass projects include energy generation from rice husks, bagasse, palm oil residues, forest 
residues, and a variety of other agricultural or industrial by-products. Energy efficiency projects take place 
in cement, steel, chemical, petrochemical and other industries and can encompass different efficiency 
measures. Hydroelectric projects have very different sizes, and smaller ones (among those including a 
dam) typically imply higher abatement costs. Finally, different countries can have different cost structures, 
with differing energy prices, taxes or financial incentives for specific technologies that may have an impact 
on overall abatement costs. Ideally, we should have a different project sample for each host country and 
estimate country-specific CDM abatement costs, however, due to the fact that most countries still have 
too few registered CDM projects, this has not been possible. 
 
CDM abatement cost curves 
Figures 3 and 4 show the estimated greenhouse gas abatement cost curves for the Chinese and for the 
other countries’ CDM. As explained above, these curves were built by taking the median abatement cost 
of each technology (shown in Figure 3) and the amount of emission reductions expected to be achieved 
annually by all CDM projects in the pipeline as of October 2009 in the respective country, also classified 
by technologies.  
 
 
 
                                                     
11 According to the monthly newsletter “CDM Highlights” issued by GTZ, CDM credit prices have fluctuated between USD 12 
and USD 33 in the spot market during 2008 and 2009, with an average of USD 20.70. 
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Figure 3: GHG abatement cost curve for the CDM pipeline: China 
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Sources: Cost data from PDDs, potentials from URC (2009), own calculations. 
 
 
Figure 4: GHG abatement cost curve for the CDM pipeline:  
South Korea, Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand, Argentina, South Africa, Israel 
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Ab
at
em
en
t c
os
t (
US
D 
/ t
C
O
2e
q)
Annual abatement (Mt CO2eq)
South Korea
Mexico
Malaysia
Thailand
Argentina
South Africa
Israel
 
Sources: Cost data from PDDs, potentials from URC (2009), own calculations. 
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It should be noted that these curves include project types without cost information. These appear at 
present at the left end of the curves, as having zero abatement costs. The projects without cost 
information represent 2.3% of the abatement potential in Thailand, 1.8% in South Korea, 1% in China, 
0.9% in Argentina, 0.7% in Israel, 0.2% in South Africa, and 0% in Malaysia and Mexico. While this 
inclusion enlarges the quantity of low-cost (or zero-cost) project options, we opted for not omitting these 
data from the curves as they allow for a more realistic picture of the overall abatement potential. This 
enables us again to be on the safe side of the estimations. 
 
Comparison with theoretical abatement curves: size 
Based on data reported in 18 climate mitigation studies in the countries included in the sample (see 
Appendix 2), theoretical greenhouse gas abatement cost curves have been built. Effort has been taken so 
that as many emission reduction options, from as many sectors (energy, industry, forestry, agriculture) as 
possible, are included in the curves. Thus, not only CO2 emissions are considered, but also methane and, 
when information was available, industrial gas emissions. In all countries, the curves were built to reflect 
the emissions reduction potential in the year 2010, which should be comparable to the current CDM 
under the above described (restrictive but safe) assumption of a static stock of mitigation options. In the 
Chinese case, an abatement curve for the year 2020 has also been included, to provide an idea of how the 
emissions reduction potential is expected to grow in the future.  
 
The indicator of the size component of the low-hanging fruit argument is provided by the horizontal 
difference between the CDM-specific and the theoretical abatement cost curves in each country. This is 
shown in Figures 5 to 10. Table 1 presents a summary, where we calculate how much of the theoretical 
abatement potential in each country is being captured by the CDM, by dividing in each case the total 
abatement expected from the CDM by the total theoretical abatement potential. 
 
Figures 5 to 10 and Table 1 show that, in all cases, the CDM is capturing only a portion of the estimated 
emissions reduction potential in the respective countries. In China, this portion is around 30%, thus it 
could be said that there is a risk that the CDM is exhausting the stock of emission reduction possibilities 
in the country. However, as time passes, new mitigation opportunities arise, so that the current CDM 
represents only about 20% of the Chinese emission reduction potential in 2020. In South Korea and 
Argentina, the CDM has captured less than 20% of the potential identified up to 2010, and in Mexico, 
South Africa and Thailand this portion is below 10%. Thus, we see that in most countries, the risk of a 
“low-hanging fruit issue” is, at least in terms of the current size of the CDM, weak. 
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Figure 5: GHG abatement cost curves in China:  
Comparison between expected CDM abatement and potential abatement  
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Figure 6: GHG abatement cost curves in South Korea:  
Comparison between expected CDM abatement and potential abatement  
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Ab
at
em
en
t 
co
st
 (U
SD
 / 
tC
O
2e
q)
Annual abatement (Mt CO2eq)
Abatement expected in the CDM
Abatement potential in 2010 (ADB, 1998; Roh, 2006a, 2006b; Roh and Kang, 2006; USEPA, 2006)
CDM potential 2010
 
 
 
20
Figure 7: GHG abatement cost curves in Mexico:  
Comparison between expected CDM abatement and potential abatement  
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Ab
at
em
en
t 
co
st
 (U
SD
 / 
tC
O
2e
q)
Annual abatement (Mt CO2eq)
Abatement expected in the CDM
Abatement potential in 2010 (Sheinbaum and Masera, 2000; USEPA, 2006; Bocanegra, 2009; Johnson, 2009)
CDM potential 2010
 
 
Figure 8: GHG abatement cost curves in South Africa:  
Comparison between expected CDM abatement and potential abatement  
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Figure 9: GHG abatement cost curves in Thailand:  
Comparison between expected CDM abatement and potential abatement  
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Figure 10: GHG abatement cost curves in Argentina:  
Comparison between expected CDM abatement and potential abatement  
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Table 1: Emissions abatement potential captured by the CDM 
Country 
Percentage of abatement potential 
captured by CDM 
30.9% of 2010 potential China 
21.0% of 2020 potential  
South Korea 17.7% of 2010 potential 
Mexico 2.1% of 2010 potential 
South Africa 1.8% of 2010 potential 
Thailand 8.8% of 2010 potential 
Argentina 17.6% of 2010 potential 
 
 
Table 2: Emissions abatement potential captured by the CDM, by technologies 
Percentage of abatement potential captured by CDM 
Technological 
category 
China 
South 
Korea 
South 
Africa 
Thailand Mexico Argentina 
Agriculture 0.0% 0.0% - - 0.0% -
Coal mine methane 15.5% - 0.0% - 25.7% -
Energy efficiency in 
households / 
commercial buildings 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -
Energy efficiency in 
industry 0.5% 0.2% 0.3% 0.0% 3.4% 2.2%
Energy efficiency in own 
generation 19.7% 0.0% infinite 20.2% 0.4% 75.4%
Thermal power 26.9% 0.0% 2.9% 0.0% 0.1% -
Forestry 120.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.2%
Fugitive emissions 4.4% 0.0% infinite - 2.2% -
Industrial gases 73.1% 209.3% infinite infinite 171.9% infinite
Renewable energy 649.4% infinite 4.5% infinite 2.9% 0.7%
Other energy 419.5% 8.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 35.0%
Waste 7.0% 9.4% 62.3% infinite 37.1% 48.5%
Transport Infinite 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Note: “Infinite” denotes a category, for which the theoretical abatement studies did not identify any emission 
reduction potential, but the CDM did nonetheless. “-“ denotes a category where no emission reduction opportunities 
were identified, neither in the CDM, nor in the theoretical studies.  
 
 
Looking in more detail at which technologies have been taken up by the CDM, Table 2 shows what 
portion of the theoretical potential is being captured by each technological category. The table shows that, 
in some sectors, such as agriculture and energy efficiency, very little of the identified potential has accessed 
the CDM. In other sectors, on the contrary, much larger emission reductions are being realized through 
the CDM than was identified in the theoretical studies, mainly in energy generation from renewable or 
other sources, or in reduction of industrial gases. On the one hand, it appears that the CDM concentrates 
in specific technological niches, on the other hand it is clear that the theoretical abatement studies did not 
uncover all the existing potential. Especially in energy generation, where many countries have experienced 
an unprecedented growth – for example the explosion of wind power capacity in China since 2006, which 
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was not foreseen by the analysts –, and where the potential for renewables is difficult to estimate, the 
projections have been too conservative. Again, because of this, we are on the safe side for drawing 
conclusions on whether the CDM is exhausting the mitigation potential.  
 
Comparison with theoretical abatement curves: costs 
In all countries analyzed, the cost range of the CDM projects (vertical axis in the abatement cost curves) 
covers only a fraction of the theoretical abatement cost range.  This can be analyzed in more detail in 
Table 3. In South Korea and Thailand, we observe that the CDM captures some very costly emission 
reduction options. These are solar energy projects, which are subsidized in both countries through feed-in 
tariffs. In China and South Africa, we see that some CDM projects reach abatement costs of nearly 65 
USD, which is also above the market price for emission reductions. In Mexico and Argentina, finally, we 
see that the CDM stays below the 20 USD limit, so that the CER price makes them attractive. From this 
analysis, we can conclude that in Mexico and Argentina, the CDM seems to be focusing exclusively on the 
cheaper projects, while in the other countries there is also some exploration of higher cost emission 
reduction opportunities. 
 
 
Table 3: Emissions abatement potential captured by the CDM, by cost categories 
Percentage of abatement potential captured by CDM 
Cost category 
China 
South 
Korea 
South 
Africa 
Thailand Mexico Argentina 
< 0 USD/tCO2eq 18.6% 0.1% 0.2% 5.0% 0.0% 18.9% 
0 - 10 USD/tCO2eq 27.6% 76.1% 2.5% 10.3% 12.4% 34.6%
10 - 20 USD/tCO2eq 134.0% 384.2% 0.3% infinite 0.1% 0.0%
20 - 30 USD/tCO2eq 86.5% 0.0% 0.0% - 0.0% 0.0%
30 - 40 USD/tCO2eq 122.5% 2.6% - - - -
40 - 50 USD/tCO2eq 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% - 0.0%
50 - 60 USD/tCO2eq 2312.6% 0.0% - - 0.0% 0.0%
60 - 70 USD/tCO2eq 0.3% 82.2% infinite 0.0% - -
70 - 80 USD/tCO2eq 0.2% 0.0% - - 0.0% 0.0%
> 80 USD/tCO2eq 1.4% 14.0% 0.0% infinite 0.0% 0.0%
Note: “Infinite” denotes a category, for which the theoretical abatement studies did not identify any emission 
reduction potential, but the CDM did nonetheless. “-“ denotes a category where no emission reduction opportunities 
were identified, neither in the CDM, nor in the theoretical studies.  
 
 
In several theoretical GHG abatement cost studies consulted (Johnson, 2009; Wetzelaer et al., 2007; 
Enkvist et al., 2007; Bakker et al., 2007; US EPA, 2006; World Bank, 2002; UNDP and GEF, 1999; ADB, 
1998), the estimated potential of GHG reduction options with net negative costs is significant. Such “no-
regret” reduction options seem to conflict with rational behaviour: if an investment entails negative costs, 
this means that it is financially profitable, and this business opportunity should have been captured. As 
reasons for the existence of this negative-cost potential, the literature mentions market imperfections 
leading to lack of knowledge about the reduction options, misaligned incentives of companies and 
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consumers, social preferences, lack of priority, lack of investments due to limited financial markets and 
differing definitions of cost (social versus financial cost). The least-cost abatement measures – especially 
demand-side energy efficiency measures and modal changes in the transport sector – imply mobilizing 
millions of diffuse emission sources across many sectors and regions, and thus achieving them may be 
politically challenging. It is often suggested that in order to remove these market barriers, high transaction 
costs are incurred that should be added to the technology costs. But these costs are not normally included 
in abatement cost studies, which mainly rely on merely technical estimations.  
 
The CDM imposes further costs to these abatement options, especially to small-scale ones: monitoring 
methodologies need to be designed and approved; project design, validation, registration and verification 
of emission reductions need to be paid for; monitoring plans and equipment need to be put in place. 
Further, organizing several small emission sources into one project, in order to make it cost-effective, is 
challenging. It is thus not too surprising that the large reduction potential from energy efficiency and 
transport, typically with abatement costs below zero, is not being taken up by the CDM. 
 
7. Conclusions and limitations of the study 
 
This paper presents a first attempt to use empirical data for testing the low hanging fruit hypothesis in the 
CDM – the argument that the CDM is using up the cheaper emission reduction options in its host 
countries, and leaving them without opportunities for cost-effective emission reductions when they adopt 
climate change mitigation commitments. By comparing the portion of the emissions reduction potential in 
six countries captured so far by the CDM with the potential available according to several studies, we 
conclude that the low-hanging fruit argument is weak. 
 
We find that the CDM is not yet taking up a large portion of the identified theoretical abatement potential 
in most of the countries assessed, with the exception of China, where it reaches about 30%. In terms of 
costs, while most of the emissions reduction opportunities grasped by the CDM lie below the 20 
USD/tCO2eq cost threshold, there is still plenty of low-cost opportunities to be harvested. Finally, while 
Mexico and Argentina appear to use the CDM exclusively for harvesting the low-hanging fruit, in the 
other countries analyzed (China, South Korea, Thailand and South Africa), also more expensive projects 
are accessing the CDM. A more detailed study of the circumstances why these more expensive projects 
have been captured could shed further light on how to direct the CDM for promoting technologies that 
are usually difficult to access and for encouraging learning effects, so that new “low-hanging fruits” can be 
created.  
 
Finally, a note on the limitations of this study. While we have tried to collect data on emission reduction 
costs and potentials from as many sources as possible, the theoretical potential identified is, as shown 
above, quite conservative, as witnessed by the many emission reduction options that the CDM captured 
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without having been identified in the theoretical studies. While this implies that the theoretical MAC 
curves we have built are to be used with care, it also means that our result – that the CDM is not yet 
capturing a large portion of this potential – is robust. Further, cost data from CDM projects is likely to be 
biased downwards for costly technologies and upwards for cheap technologies. The reason for this bias is 
that CDM projects need to demonstrate that they are financially unattractive without the CDM revenues, 
but that these revenues make them attractive. The few very expensive projects found in the CDM 
acknowledged that they were not financially feasible, but that they were intended for demonstration 
purposes.  
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Appendix 1: Standardization of discount rates 
 
Country 
Standardized 
discount rate
Argentina 10%
Brazil 15%
China 8%
India 12%
Indonesia 12%
Israel 10%
Kenya 15%
Malaysia 10%
Mexico 12%
Morocco 15%
Qatar 10%
South Africa 12%
South Korea 7%
Thailand 10%
United Arab Emirates 8%
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Appendix 2: Sources of data for theoretical MAC curves 
 
Country Data sources 
Argentina National CDM/JI Strategy Studies (NSS) Program, 
1999; UNDP/GEF, 1999 
China Yamaguchi, 2004; Yamaguchi, 2005; US EPA, 
2006; Wetzelaer et al., 2007; Cai et al., 2008 
Mexico Sheinbaum and Masera, 2000; US EPA, 2006; 
Bocanegra, 2009; Johnson, 2009 
South Africa World Bank, 2002; Winkler et al., 2008 
South Korea Asian Development Bank, 1998; Roh, 2006a; Roh, 
2006b; Roh and Kang, 2006; US EPA, 2006 
Thailand Asian Development Bank, 1998; Asian Regional 
Research Programme in Energy, Environment and 
Climate (ARRPEEC), 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
